Sales by Berns, Sheldon I.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 11 | Issue 3
1960
Sales
Sheldon I. Berns
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Sheldon I. Berns, Sales, 11 Wes. Res. L. Rev. 416 (1960)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol11/iss3/24
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
use is contrary to a deed restriction; the same rule does not hold true
when the restriction is imposed by zoning laws.' 5 Thus, the supreme
court held that compensation for land taken pursuant to an exercise
of the power of eminent domain, and for damages to the residue
thereof not taken, can properly be based upon evidence as to its value
for commercial use, notwithstanding that such land was held under
a deed containing restrictions against using the land except for a
children's home and against selling it.
The reasoning of the court appears sound. The owner, by being
compensated on possible commercial use contra to his deed restric-
tion, is to some extent getting a windfall, but the appropriating
agency is paying no more than the property is worth. Certainly the
original restricting grantor did not contemplate benefiting an ap-
propriating agency by reducing the otherwise fair market value of
the premises. However, when use of the property is restricted by
zoning laws, obviously evidence as to the most valuable use must con-
template the zoning restrictions, to be realistic.-6
RIGHTS OF RIPARIAN OWNER
From antiquity, water right fights have plagued the courts. Each
year Ohio is blessed with its fair share of definitive cases. Bey v.
Wright Place, Incorporated-7 is of value in distinguishing between
a defined and the absence of a defined watercourse.' While the lower
riparian owner must accept natural surface drainage and discharge
into a defined watercourse,' 9 the lower owner has an action for dam-
ages by reason of an unnatural accumulation of surface water not
being discharged into a defined watercourse.
MARSHALL I. NURENBERG
SALES
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE ACT
Two cases were decided in 1959 which limit the scope of the Ohio
Certificate of Title Act.' Both cases involved the interpretation of
section 4505.04 of the act, which provides in part:
No person acquiring a motor vehicle from the owner thereof,
whether such owner is a manufacturer, importer, dealer, or otherwise,
15. City of Euclid v. Lakeshore Co., 102 Ohio App. 96, 133 N.E.2d 372 (1956).
16. Ibid.
17. 108 Ohio App. 10, 160 N.E.2d 378 (1956).
18. Rights of lower riparian owner to free flow of stream in defined watercourse with case
law on definition can be found in Kistler v. Watson, 156 N.E.2d 833 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
19. 41 OHIO JuR. Waters § 46 (1935).
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shall acquire any right, title, claim, or interest in or to said motor
vehicle until such person has had issued to him a certificate of title to
said motor vehicle, or delivered to him a manufacturer's or importer's
certificate for it; nor shall waiver or estoppel operate in favor of such
person against a person having possession of such certificate of tide,
or manufacturer's or importer's certificate for said motor vehicle, for a
valuable consideration.
No court in any case at law or in equity shall recognize the right,
title, claim, or interest of any person in or to any motor vehicle sold or
disposed of, or mortgaged or encumbered, unless evidenced . . . by a
certificate of title or a manufacturer's or importer's certificate ....
In Sun Finance & Loan Company v. Hadlock, the Cuyahoga
County Court of Appeals ruled that an unpaid mechanic who had per-
formed repairs on an automobile could assert a common-law artisan's
lien despite the mandate contained in section 4505.04. It appears
that the right to possession under an artisan's lien is a "right" encom-
passed by the language in this section. However, the court stated
that in the absence of dear legislative intent, it would not hold the
Certificate of Title Act to have destroyed common-law artisan's
liens. 8
In Mutual Finance Company v. Meade,4 plaintiff instituted ac-
tions in replevin against the purchasers of several automobiles. Un-
known to the defendants at the time of sale, the dealer from whom
the cars were purchased had executed, pursuant to a floor plan agree-
ment, wholesale chattel mortgages to plaintiff, the latter holding as
security manufacturer's statements of origin or Ohio certificates of
title to each automobile.
As part payment for his automobile, each purchaser had issued a
note and a chattel mortgage to the dealer, who subsequently assigned
the same to plaintiff. Instead of accepting the purchaser's note in
payment of the dealer's indebtedness and cancelling the wholesale
mortgage, plaintiff paid the amount of the note to the dealer, and,
thus, held both the wholesale and retail mortgages on each car.
Thereafter, the dealer became bankrupt, having failed to deliver a
certificate of title to any of the purchasers.
The plaintiff asserted ownership by virtue of Ohio Revised Code
section 4505.04, noted above, and section 4505.13, which provides in
part:
... Exposure for sale of any motor vehicle by the owner thereof, with
the knowledge or with the knowledge and consent of the holder of any
lien, mortgage, or encumbrance thereon, shall not render such lien,
mortgage, or encumbrance ineffective as against the creditors of such
1. Ouxo Riy. CoDE cL 4505.
2. 162 N.E.2d 131 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
3. See also a discussion of this case concerning election of remedies by a purchase-money
mortgage in Personal Property section, p. 413 supra.
4. 161 N.X.2d 561 (Ohio C.P. 1959).
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owner, or against the holders of subsequent liens, mortgages, or en-
cumbrances upon such motor vehicle....
In ruling in favor of the defendants, the court held that (1) sec-
tion 4505.13 was not intended to terminate the "floor plan rule" in
Ohio, whereby an owner who has placed for sale an automobile in a
retail dealer's showroom is estopped to deny the title of an innocent
purchaser who bought the automobile in the regular course of trade
and without actual notice of the floor plan mortgage; (2) that the
doctrine of agency by apparent authority is still available under the
Certificate of Title Act to a purchaser who can prove to the satisfac-
tion of a jury that he was justified in relying upon authority appar-
ently vested in the vendor of an automobile by the owner thereof;
and (3) that when a finance company approves and accepts retail
notes and mortgages given by innocent purchasers of automobiles on
which wholesale mortgages are retained by the finance company, the
latter is guilty of constructive fraud, and "must be deemed to have
extinguished its floor plan or wholesale mortgage liens . . .5
What legal or equitable principle the court intended as a basis
for the statement quoted immediately above is not disclosed by the
court's opinion. Further, this holding appears to be of less legal sig-
nificance when it is noted that in an unreported addendum to the
Meade case, the court rendered a decision against the same plaintiff
in actions instituted for the recovery of several automobiles from pur-
chasers who either had paid cash for their cars or had financed the
purchase of them with a company other than the plaintiff.
Although the court's position in the Meade case can be justified
on moral grounds, it appears to be unsupportable in view of the
language contained in Ohio Revised Code sections 4505.04 and
4505.13."
The decisions in Hadlock and Meade indicate the need of legisla-
tive revision of the Certificate of Title Act in order to bring it in line
with popular concepts of justice, and to alleviate the necessity for
Ohio courts to emasculate the language of the act in order to protect
the purchaser from the fraud which the act was intended to prevent.
BREACH OF WARRANTY
Of the four cases concerning breach of warranty reported during
the period of this Survey, three are worthy of comment.
5. Id. at 565.
6. Subsequent to the completion of this article, the lower court decisions were affirmed by the
Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals both as to those cases wherein plaintiff held the wholesale
and retail mortgages on each automobile, and as to those cases wherein plaintiff held only the
wholesale mortgage. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Municipal Employees Union Local 1099, 165 N.E.2d
435 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960); Mutual Fin. Co. v. Kozoil, 165 N.E.2d 444 (Ohio Ct. App.
1960). [Ed.]
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Because privity of contract was lacking, the Court of Appeals for
Madison County, in Steele v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation,
7
refused to allow an action for wrongful death to be tried upon a
theory of breach of warranty where an allegedly defective milk cooler
manufactured by defendant resulted in the death by electrocution of
the purchaser's tenant, for whose use the purchaser supplied the
cooler. The court failed to consider dictum by the Ohio Supreme
Court in Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Company' to the effect
that the court would be willing to reconsider a prior holding9 that
privity of contract was necessary for an action based upon implied
warranty of fitness. 10
Two cases reported concerned the damages recoverable in actions
involving misrepresentations made by dealers in the sale of automo-
biles. The first of these, Crabbe v. Freeman," was an action in
fraud. In deciding an issue of first impression in Ohio, the Munici-
pal Court of Columbus held that all the elements of fraud were pres-
ent, and, thus, that punitive damages were recoverable by plaintiff
where the speedometer of a used automobile purchased by him was
set back with the knowledge of the dealer, who failed to disclose that
fact to plaintiff. Fraud was stated to be an exception to the doctrine
of caveat emptor.
In the second case, Craig v. Spitzer Motors of Columbus, Incor-
porated,'2 the Franklin County Court of Appeals held that punitive,
as well as compensatory damages were recoverable in an action for
breach of warranty where an automobile, knowingly misrepresented
by defendant to be a "demonstrator," actually had been used to pull
a trailer from Ohio to Florida. The court ruled that Ohio Revised
Code section 1315.70, which provides that the measure of damages
in an action for breach of warranty is the difference between the
value of the goods received and the value as represented, "does not
exclude the right to punitive damages . . . if the facts justify such
result."' 3 In support of its conclusion, the court cited Ohio Revised
Code section 1315.71, which allows the recovery of special damages,
and section 1315.74, which states that "in any case not provided for
7. 107 Ohio App. 379, 159 N.E.2d 469 (1958). For a further discussion of this case, see
Torts section, p. 436 infra.
8. 167 Ohio St. 244, 249, 147 N.E.2d 612, 616 (1958) (dictum). For a discussion of the
Rogers case, see 9 WEST. RES. L. REV. 511 (1958).
9. Wood v. General Elec. Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953).
10. In Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181
(1958), the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, relying upon the dictum in the Rogers
case, concluded that it was permissible to allow an action to be tried upon the theory of breach
of implied -warranty in the absence of privity of contract. See Sonenfield, Sales, Survey of
Ohio Law - 1958, 10 WEST. REs. L. REv. 436 (1959).
11. 160 N.E.2d 583 (Ohio Munic. Ct. 1959).
12. 160 N.E.2d 537 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
13. Id. at 540.
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